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define as workers with high school or less education—compared to those with college or more. 
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Recession (2007–2010) and recovery (2010–2019). We also present results by gender and race. 
We find real wage growth in the latter period for all workers, but not enough to change the long-
term trends of growing inequality and stagnant wages for the less-educated; and we also find that 
labor force participation continued to decline for the less-educated, even during the recovery. 
Gaps between whites and blacks also grew, while Hispanics and Asians made more progress. We 
consider various explanations of these findings and show that the early effects of the 2020‒2021 
pandemic recession hurt less-educated workers and those of color more than anyone else. 
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 It is no longer news that most U.S. workers, especially those without college degrees, saw 
wages stagnate over the past four decades; that inequality rose dramatically in this period; and 
that millions of prime-age workers left the labor market (Groshen and Holzer 2019). Equally true 
is that during the past dozen years, the U.S. labor market experienced unusually wide swings in 
labor market conditions, which also affected workers’ outcomes. As we now experience the 
ongoing COVID-19 recession in 2020–2021, this paper assesses how those two powerful 
influences (the long-run trends and the recent business cycles) interacted in the U.S. labor 
market, with particular focus on the continuing disappointing trends for noncollege workers.   
 On the one hand, the Great Recession of 2007–2010 was a cataclysmic event for U.S. 
workers, generating the worst declines in employment observed in the nearly 80 years since the 
Great Depression.1 The recession was not only deep, but recovery from it also occurred quite 
slowly.2 On the other hand, the recovery lasted the longest of any on record, ultimately resulting 
in the lowest U.S. unemployment rates since the late 1960s. Indeed, by February 2020, we had 
had nearly five years of unemployment rates at or below 5 percent, which is also the longest such 
period since the 1960s. Then, starting in March and especially in April 2020, the labor market 
deteriorated very rapidly because of the Covid-19 recession. It recovered partially in the late 
spring and early summer, but the recovery then slowed and eventually flatlined after October.  
 
1 The Great Recession began in late 2007 but worsened substantially in 2008–2009. The economy began its 
recovery in mid-2009 but not in the labor market until early 2010, since employment changes lag behind those in 
output. 
2 Unemployment peaked at about 10 percent in early 2010 and remained at or above 8 percent well into 
2012. 
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 These labor market oscillations likely generated some lasting outcomes for workers, both 
negative and positive. The Great Recession, which was both severe and long-lasting, had 
detrimental effects on workers that may have continued long into the recovery.  Economists refer 
to these long-lasting effects of temporary recessions as hysteresis, as some workers are scarred 
by lengthy spells without work, reducing their attractiveness to employers and/or their skills and 
labor market contacts. On the other hand, a relatively tight labor market that lasts for many years 
can support higher wage growth and career opportunities, perhaps with differentially large 
impacts on less-educated workers. 
 Economists still debate the extent to which the labor market tightened during the 
recovery. Various forms of “hidden unemployment” persisted and wage growth was modest 
throughout most of it. Yet both the length and depth of the recovery clearly brought many 
workers back into the labor force who had left, and enabled many to enjoy several years of 
positive real wage growth. But after these years of progress, the pandemic recession of 2020 
again imposed great employment losses on less-educated workers and those of color. 
 In this paper, we examine wage and employment outcomes for prime-age U.S. workers—
i.e., aged 25–54—over the period 1979–2019, with particular emphasis on the later years. Prime-
age workers are the ones whom it is most sensible to analyze, since they have mostly completed 
their schooling but have not yet begun to retire. The years 2000–2007 and 2007–2019 constituted 
two full business cycles, with cyclical peaks in 2000 and 2007, a Great Recession trough in 
2010, and another peak in 2019. We therefore present a range of employment outcomes for the 
years 1979, 2000, 2007, 2010, and 2019—but with a particular focus on the Great Recession and 
its recovery between 2007 and 2019. We also contrast outcomes for workers with bachelor’s 
degrees or above with outcomes for workers who, at most, finished high school (these constitute 
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the “working class” in many analyses, including ours), with outcomes also broken down by 
gender and race.3 
 After presenting these results, we discuss the long-run market and institutional forces 
behind the most disturbing trends in the labor market. We consider the extent to which the Great 
Recession and subsequent recovery interacted with these forces to generate longer-term 
improvement in some outcomes and further deterioration in others.  
 With this context in mind, we then turn to the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic and 
associated recession on worker outcomes, and the extent to which less-educated workers and 
those of color suffered the worst employment losses through the end of 2020. Though we do not 
yet know the full extent to which these workers will suffer long-term employment losses, the 
data we have to date are worrisome. We conclude by summarizing our findings and considering 
implications for future trends and policy. 
II. TRENDS IN EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS, 1979–2019   
 We now consider trends in three major employment outcomes for U.S. workers: 1) 
employment, 2) overall real wages, and 3) labor force participation. We will consider some 
outcomes over the entire 40-year period between 1979 and 2019, but with a particular focus on 
the years since 2007. We also consider outcomes for all workers, but with some particular 
attention to those with high school or less education—whom we consider to be the U.S. working 
class—and how their outcomes differ from those of college graduates. 
 
3 Workers with some college but no degree are excluded when comparing outcomes for college and high 
school graduates. 
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 Figures 1, 2, and 3 present the aggregate trends since 1979 in employment-to-population 
ratios, labor force participation, and median real hourly wages, respectively, for the population 
aged 25–54. We adjust wages for inflation using the chain-weighted GDP deflator for personal 
consumption expenditures.4 The wage measures exclude other forms of compensation, like 
employer 401K contributions and the value of employer-provided health care; they also exclude 
other transfer payments from government.     
 The employment-to-population ratio (Figure 1) follows the well-known peaks and 
troughs in business cycles over the past 40 years, especially during the Great Recession and 
afterward. Overall employment rates rose until 2000 but declined a bit during the years 
afterward. By 2019, employment had recovered to its prerecession level in 2007, though not to 
its earlier peak in 2000. This (and our other aggregate findings below) are consistent with 
Shambaugh and Strain (2021). 
 Trends in labor force participation (Figure 2) and real wages (Figure 3) are somewhat less 
cyclical. Participation among prime-age workers rose until 2000 and declined somewhat 
thereafter; it declined overall during the Great Recession but had almost recovered to its 2007 
level by 2019.  
 We also note that median real wages rose by only about 18 percent over the entire 40-
year period, with notable increases occurring only in the late 1990s to early 2000s and 2014–
2019. Indeed, during the latter five-year period, median real wages rose about 8 percent 
overall—a welcome development, though not enough to change the overall view of relative wage 
stagnation over four decades.  
 
4 Real wages decline a bit more rapidly over time if one deflates nominal wages with the Consumer Price 
Index for Urban Workers research series—CPI-U-RS—since the research series adjusts for some but not all of the 
overstatement of annual inflation in the traditional CPI. See Moulton (2018) for a comparison of GDP and CPI 
deflators over time. Wage figures throughout the paper appear in 2019 dollars.   
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 These broad aggregate trends in employment, participation, and real wages mask 
considerable variation by education and gender over time. Figures 4 and 5 display trends in 
median real wages separately for men and women, and for those with high school or less 
education (Figure 4) and those with college (bachelor’s) degrees (Figure 5). We do the same for 
labor force participation rates in Figures 6 and 7.   
 We present both sets of outcomes at five points in time: business cycle peaks in 1979, 
2000, and 2007, the trough of the Great Recession in 2010, and the most recent cyclical peak in 
2019. These comparisons enable us to infer just how much employment outcomes had 
deteriorated by 2010, and the extent to which they recovered in the subsequent nine-year 
expansion, particularly for noncollege workers. 
 Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the following outcomes for U.S. workers’ median real wages: 
● Over the past 40 years, but especially during the years 1979–2000, real wages grew 
rapidly for those with bachelor’s degrees but were flat or declining for those 
without—that is, the “working class”—with better growth among women than men in 
both cases.  
● During the recovery from the Great Recession, median real wages increased for all 
workers, with increases of roughly similar magnitudes.  
Therefore, as seen in Figures 4 and 5, earnings inequality has risen substantially in the past 40 
years by education within gender groups, but it has declined between gender groups. 
 We also know from published summary data that nominal wage growth (i.e., without 
adjusting for inflation) remained somewhat modest after the Great Recession compared to earlier 
periods of time; indeed, such increases barely ever rose much above 3 percent. But inflation has 
also remained unusually low throughout this period despite the recovery from the Great 
Recession, thereby translating modest nominal wage gains into more significant real wage 
increases. It is also notable (as seen in Figure 3) that early wage gains in the period 2014–2019 
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were needed to offset a bit of wage loss in the first few years of recovery (beginning in 2010), 
before overall real wage growth could be observed.  
 Still, the length of this expansion allowed such increases to accumulate over time and 
result in significant wage growth. And, as labor markets have been at least somewhat tight for a 
lengthy period, the relatively greater sensitivity of disadvantaged workers to the business cycle 
(Aaronson et al. 2019) has translated into mildly greater wage increases for them. Minimum 
wage increases at the state and local levels no doubt added to real wage growth among the 
lowest-wage workers.5 Still, the observed wage increases in the recovery do not greatly change 
the overall pattern of inequality growth across education groups over the past 40 years. 
 Figures 6 and 7 illustrate the following trends in labor force participation: 
● It has declined the most over the past four decades for non-college-educated men, 
while it rose rapidly for both less-educated and more-educated women from 1979 to 
2000. 
● It declined somewhat for most workers from 2000 to 2007, and then again in the 
Great Recession. 
● Participation in the labor force had fully recovered for college-educated women by 
2019, but not for the working class or for men.6 
It is concerning that labor force participation has mostly leveled off for women overall since 
2000, leaving their participation rates about 10 percentage points lower than those of men among 
people with bachelor’s degrees (Figure 7). Women with only a high school education have 
participation rates about 20 percentage points lower than comparable men (Figure 6). 
 When viewing trends over time by education, it is important to note that the composition 
of these groups has been changing for two major reasons: 1) college enrollment and completion 
 
5 https://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/state-minimum-wage-chart.aspx. 
6 Again, focusing on the years only since 2014 would no doubt show greater increases. 
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rates have risen substantially over this 40-year period, and 2) immigrants constitute larger 
fractions of men with high school or less education than before. 
All else being equal, these two compositional changes would depress observed real wage 
growth among less-educated men. The shift toward college enrollment would also tend to reduce 
labor force participation, though the greater presence of immigrants would raise it (since 
immigrant men have very high rates of labor force participation). Furthermore, the tendency of 
less-educated men to withdraw from the labor force tends to truncate the lower end of the wage 
distribution for men and raise their observed hourly wage rate. The net effect of all of these 
compositional changes on observed wages and participation is therefore unclear, and the changes 
do not clearly bias results in the downward direction for less-educated men. 
Importantly, though participation for women rose consistently in the 1980s and 1990s 
(and earlier), it has been uneven since then. Despite their recovery from the Great Recession, the 
trend toward higher participation of American women in the late twentieth century remains 
stalled in the twenty-first century.  
Besides the effects documented above on men and women by education, what have 
similar trends looked like by race? In Tables 1 and 2, we present median real wage (Figure 1) 
and labor force participation trends (Figure 2) by race and gender. We present some data for five 
racial groups—1) non-Hispanic whites, 2) blacks, 3) Hispanics, 4) Asians, and 5) Pacific 
Islander/American Indians. Since not all of these groups were identified in CPS data all the way 
back to 1979, we present data for those years in which they are available. Accordingly, we 
present data for whites and blacks starting in 1979, for Hispanics and Asians starting in 2000, 
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and for Pacific Islanders/American Indians (for whom we have separate data only in 
participation rates, not in wages) starting in 2007.7 
 The results of Table 1 indicate the following: 
• Real wages have risen strongly since 2000 for Asians (by about a third), Hispanics 
(by 20–25 percent), and white females (by nearly half since 1979 and by about 20 
percent since 2000).  
• Real wages also rose somewhat more modestly for black females (by about a third 
since 1979 and about 12 percent since 2000). 
• Real wage growth has been quite modest for white males and almost nonexistent for 
black males over the past 40 years. 
• All groups experienced some wage growth after 2010, especially Hispanics and 
Asians. 
The results of Table 2 on labor force participation indicate these trends: 
• Fairly constant participation among Asians, Pacific Islanders/American Indians, and 
Hispanics over time, with mostly modest increases for women and decreases among 
men for the latter two ethnic groups. 
• Large declines in participation among white and especially black men since 1979.  
• Large increases in participation among white and black females before 2000 but fairly 
flat since then. 
• Modestly increasing participation (1 or 2 percentage points) for most groups of 
women but mixed results for men during the recovery from the recession in 2010–
2019.  
Overall, the results by race show impressive gains in wages and/or work activity for 
Asians, Hispanics, and white women, disturbing declines in work for white and black men, and 
rising gaps between whites and blacks overall. Our results are also broadly consistent with Biu, 
Famighetti and Hamilton (2021) on blacks, Orrenius and Zavodny (2021) on Hispanics, and 
 
7 Separate data for Hispanics and Asians in the CPS only became available during the 1990s; for American 
Indians and Pacific Islanders they became available in 2003. In data before that time, the latter groups are merged 
with Asians but do not materially affect results for Asians. Even today, American Indians and Pacific Islanders 
constitute just 1 percent of the U.S. population, while Asians represent over 6 percent.  
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Akee (2021) on Pacific Islanders and American Indians). If anything, the declining labor force 
activity we observe among black men is underrepresented in the civilian labor-force data due to 
the underrepresentation of particular subgroups.8  
Finally, Figures 8 and 9 summarize the observed trends in real wages and labor force 
participation for our education-by-gender and race-by-gender groups over the full business cycle 
generated by the Great Recession and the recovery afterward, 2007–2019. Figure 8 focuses on 
education and gender groups, while Figure 9 focuses on race and gender. The results again show, 
for the entire cycle, major earnings gains for white women, Hispanics, and Asians; modestly 
improving labor force participation for most racial groups of women but not for those with high 
school or less education; and modest wage gains plus flat or declining participation for white and 
black men, especially for the less-educated. 
 In sum, the Great Recession and our recovery from it did not greatly change longer-term 
patterns of rising inequality between the working class and college-educated workers in the 
United States, either in real wages or in labor force activity. 
III. WHAT EXPLAINS THESE TRENDS IN LABOR MARKET OUTCOMES? 
 What accounts for the overall trends in earnings and labor force participation that we 
have documented, and also for different trends by gender and education, over the past four 
decades, and more specifically during the period 2007‒2019? We first consider the secular and 
 
8 Low-income black men, and especially those previously incarcerated, are undercounted in the census and 
other surveys (Pettit 2012). These groups have very low labor-force participation rates, so their absence in the data 
leads participation rates of less-educated men to be understated. Casual or informal work among such men likely 
offsets these trends, but only partially. See also Kahn-Lang (2019). 
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cyclical trends in earnings, which might partly drive the labor force participation trends. We 
discuss these trends second. 
A. Earnings Trends: Markets, Institutions, and Business Cycles 
 In a purely statistical sense, three factors appear to drive the stagnation of aggregate 
wages over the past 40 years: 1) declining productivity growth, 2) a decline in labor’s share of 
productivity and income, and 3) a growing share of labor compensation accounted for by 
nonpecuniary benefits like health care. But explaining why each of these three trends has 
occurred is somewhat more challenging. 
 With the exception of the tech boom years (mid-1990s to mid-2000s), U.S. productivity 
growth has been sluggish (Baily 2015). And though there has been some decoupling of worker 
compensation from productivity during this period, a strong correlation remains (Stansbury and 
Summers 2018). Possible culprits for sluggish productivity growth include the aging workforce 
(Ozimek, DeAntonio, and Zandi 2017), too little investment in research and development 
(Gruber and Johnson 2019), declining labor market fluidity (Molloy et al. 2016) and “secular 
stagnation” (Rachel and Summers 2019). 
 Shifting distributions of productivity and income toward capital might be attributable to 
rising automation (Acemoglu and Restrepo 2018), but they also could reflect the growing power 
of employers in both product and labor markets. While technology, globalization, and 
deregulation in the 1980s and 1990s were seen as forces enhancing product market competition, 
rising product market concentrations since then may have offset those effects (Philippon 2019), 
though the evidence on this point remains a bit mixed (Autor et al. 2017; Basu 2019).  
 Whether or not the monopsony power of employers has risen also remains unclear, 
though it seems to have risen in some industries like health care (Prager and Schmitt 2021). 
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Rising employer practices such as noncompete and nondisclosure agreements might also 
contribute to monopsony in some industries (Krueger and Posner 2018; Nunn and Hunt 2021). 
Finally, the growing share of worker compensation accounted for by health care no doubt 
reduces pecuniary worker compensation. While the increases in these shares over time are not 
much higher in recent decades than before (Burtless and Milusheva 2012), they clearly reinforce 
the other determinants of lower compensation growth described above.  
 Whatever explains the overall stagnation in worker earnings, rising earnings inequality in 
virtually every dimension (except gender) has contributed as well to stagnant median earnings.9 
The debates between those emphasizing labor market forces like skill-biased technical change 
(SBTC), globalization, and declining growth of the college-educated population versus those 
emphasizing weakening institutions like unions and federal minimum wages are well known at 
this point (Groshen and Holzer 2019). Even those emphasizing changes in the demand for and 
supply of college-educated workers in the market have noted the flattening of the ratio of college 
to high school wages since 2000, while inequality has risen within the higher-skilled group and 
especially between those with only bachelor’s degrees and those with graduate degrees (Autor, 
Goldin, and Katz 2020).  
 Still, a few new developments in the empirical literature on rising earnings inequality are 
noteworthy. For one thing, differences between firms account for more of the variance in 
employee earnings over time than in the past (Barth et al. 2014). At the same time, the rising 
capital intensity of “superstar” firms (Autor et al. 2017) and institutional developments might 
also limit the ability of workers to share in firm-level product market success.  Another 
 
9 While gender differences are not a main focus of this paper, the decline in the gender earnings gap has 
largely been driven by rising relative education and earnings among women, as well as declining discrimination and 
product market shifts from manufacturing to services (Blau and Kahn 2016).   
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possibility is that information problems prevent employers from tapping into skills developed on 
the job by experienced noncollege workers (Blair et al. 2020).   
 Beyond declining unionism, Weil (2019) has called our attention to the growth in 
“fissured” workplaces—i.e., those in which different occupational groups under the same roof 
and at the same firm actually work for different employers. Although we have limited data on 
this, such fissuring likely prevents many groups of workers from sharing in the product market 
success of firms that sell the goods and services they produce. It also reduces firms’ incentives to 
invest in educating or training their workers, to whom they now have little long-term 
commitment. Accordingly, an increase in fissuring over time likely contributes to a widening 
compensation gap between less-educated and more-educated workers (and between labor and 
capital) over time as well. 
 Fissuring workplaces are part of a broader story of a likely shift from “high road” to “low 
road” human resource strategies among many firms for their less-educated workers (Osterman 
2017). Firms can sometimes choose to compete in high workers’ skills and performance 
(accompanied by better compensation, more worker training, and/or profit sharing) rather than 
low labor costs. Evidence suggests that in recent years, firms are less interested in the former 
approach. Since high-road employers generate a public good for workers, their families, and their 
communities, an argument can be made that they should receive some public support through 
technical assistance or subsidies.  
 Strikingly, the common thread in all these explanations is that they are not likely to 
subside or reverse in the near future without direct policy action.  The business cycle might 
speed or slow these forces, but it rarely changes the broad trends. 
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 In this context, how did the Great Recession and subsequent recovery affect earnings 
among less-educated workers? While the employment of non‒college graduates appears more 
cyclically sensitive than that of college grads (Hines et al. 2002), the evidence suggests that 
wages of young college graduates might be hurt somewhat more than those of non‒college 
graduates when they enter the labor market in serious recessions (Altonji, Kahn, and Speer 
2014), with effects persisting for many years. This might be true at least partly because wage 
growth among these graduates depends more on work experience, which recessions disrupt, as 
well as the quality of employer-employee matches, which recessions impede as well.  
 But there is also evidence that the new technologies that limit the earnings of the working 
class—thereby generating SBTC—are more frequently implemented during recessions 
(Jaimovich and Siu 2012), since the disruption costs of implementing them are lowered when 
business is down. Furthermore, we have clear evidence that firms raise worker education 
requirements during recessions, since college graduates are relatively more available than at 
other points in the business cycle; but the evidence also suggests that, as recovery from 
recessions occurs, at least some of the higher skill requirements remain in place (Hershbein and 
Kahn 2018). 
 As we noted earlier, earnings among disadvantaged workers rose a bit more in the past 
five years than those of more-educated workers (see also Aaronson et al. 2019), but overall 
earnings growth was not sufficient to offset decades of stagnation. Labor markets were also less 
tight during the recovery than the unemployment rate suggested (Blanchflower 2019). The flow 
of workers out of the labor force during the Great Recession, which we describe more fully 
below, generated a larger pool of potential workers available to gradually reenter as the labor 
market tightened, thereby reducing the pressure on employers to raise wages substantially. 
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B. Labor Force Participation, Earnings, and the Business Cycle  
 As we note above, labor force participation of women rose consistently during the second 
half of the twentieth century, though it dipped after 2000. It also declined modestly during the 
Great Recession, as we would expect, but only among college-educated females did it fully 
rebound to its 2007 levels by 2019.  
 In contrast, participation by less-educated men declined consistently over the past four 
decades, and notably during the Great Recession. It also failed to recover during the expansion. 
These developments reflect both the greater cyclical sensitivity of male employment—as males 
remain more heavily represented in cyclical industries like construction and manufacturing—and 
perhaps more hysteresis (or long-term scarring) as well from their earlier employment declines.   
 What accounts for different participation trends between women and men? The rising 
education and earnings potential of women compared to men no doubt has generated different 
“labor supply” responses—rising for women and falling for men, as we would expect if their 
labor supply elasticities (measuring effects of wages on willingness to work) are positive.10  
 At the same time, it seems unlikely that relative wage opportunities, and movements up 
and down their respective “labor supply” functions, explain all of these differences. For women, 
decreasing marriage rates and rising single parenthood no doubt contributed to their greater need 
to work, even at low wages. And changes in income support policies—including welfare reform 
and the rise of the Earned Income Tax Credit in the 1980s and 1990s—raised incentives to work 
for low-income women. International experience suggests that work among women would likely 
 
10 Historically, full-time work among prime-age men was widely regarded as socially mandated. But the 
withdrawal of so many noncollege prime-age men from the workforce in recent decades (Eberstadt 2016; Krueger 
2017) as their earnings deteriorated clearly indicates increases over time in their labor supply elasticities, as 
discretion about whether and how much to work among men has grown more acceptable. 
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have continued to rise had the United States adopted more “family friendly” policies, such as 
child care assistance and paid family leave (Black, Schanzenbach, and Breitwieser 2017).  
 Similarly, declining work among less-educated men cannot be fully explained by their 
stagnant or declining wages (Binder and Bound 2019). For African American men, criminal 
records and perhaps child support arrears reduce labor force participation (Eberstadt 2016; 
Holzer, Offner, and Sorenson 2005).  
 More broadly, poor health and disability among less-educated men reduce work effort, 
but only partly through dependence on disability insurance (Krueger 2017). Geographic 
imbalances in labor market strength—exacerbated by declining manufacturing employment after 
2000 (Autor, Dorn, and Hanson 2016) and the reduced geographic mobility of workers (Austin, 
Glaeser, and Summers 2018)—further contribute to declining work among blue-collar workers 
and especially working-class men in recent years.  
 Given these forces, it is not surprising that labor force participation among less-educated 
workers (particularly for men) remained lower during the recovery from the Great Recession in 
those geographic areas hit hardest by the downturn (Yagan 2018), as hysteresis suggests. The 
deteriorating skills and networks that occur as a result of lengthy periods of nonwork, plus 
diminishing employer interest (Krueger, Kramer, and Cho 2014), seem to hurt less-educated men 
the most. 
IV. WHAT ABOUT THE PANDEMIC RECESSION OF 2020–2021? 
 The pandemic-induced recession of 2020 began with notable employment losses in 
March, followed by extreme job losses in April. Then a recovery began in May—rapid at first, 
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then slower. During the months of November and December, employment rates were completely 
flat. 
 In Table 3 we present employment-to-population rates, adjusted for reported absences 
from work (for reasons other than vacation, illness, weather, or labor disputes), in the aggregate 
and then for subgroups by race, gender, and education. We present these rates for selected 
months, beginning with the prerecession month of February, continuing through the trough in 
April, and then for selected months until December 2020.11  
 The results in Table 3 in the aggregate show the rapid decline, rapid partial recovery, and 
then slowing recovery that occurred during the recession of 2020. Indeed, employment fell about 
18 percentage points between February and April, then rose about 12 points between April and 
December in the aggregate. 
 Table 3 also illustrates the extent to which workers of color and those with high school or 
less education bore the brunt of the recession. Employment fell most rapidly for Hispanics and 
also among blacks until April, and by the end of the year employment for each group remained 
about eight points lower than in February. High school graduates experienced the largest initial 
declines, while those with postgraduate education experienced the least; these patterns of relative 
employment decline still held as of December.   
 Indeed, this recession has hit the least-educated harder than earlier ones, and their 
recoveries have been slower since the sectors hardest hit have been leisure/hospitality and 
personal services, where such workers are concentrated. And the fact that highly educated 
 
11 These rates are drawn from computations using CPS-ORG data in Hershbein and Holzer (2021). Besides 
the adjustment in the outcome variable, these tabulations are also based on a broader age sample—18–64—than we 
used in earlier figures and in Tables 1 and 2. For additional analysis of COVID-19 labor market impacts through 
September 2020 by demographic group, see Groshen (2020). 
17 
workers can much more easily telecommute than those less educated has exacerbated 
employment gaps during the recovery. 
 At the time of this writing, we do not yet know what the labor market recovery will look 
like in 2021 and beyond, or the extent to which long-term unemployment and permanent job loss 
will occur. But to date, less-educated workers and those of color have endured the highest rates 
of permanent job loss (Hershbein and Holzer 2021).  
 The pandemic has likely accelerated the long-run shift toward online shopping in retail 
trade and ordering food in leisure and hospitality, as well as the role of telecommuting (which 
will hurt the service industries that cater to workers in downtown business districts). If so, less-
educated workers and those of color will continue to sustain disproportionately high permanent 
job losses in 2021 and beyond. In other words, skill-biased technical changes associated with this 
recession and eventual recovery will likely add to the plight of our lowest-wage workers.  
V. CONCLUSION       
 Three disappointing labor market trends over the past 40 years are widely known: 1) 
median real wages have been fairly stagnant, 2) inequality between workers with and without 
college degrees has dramatically increased, and 3) many less-educated prime-age men have left 
the labor force. At the same time, gender inequality in both earnings and labor force activity has 
declined.     
 The Great Recession affected earnings and labor force trends in a number of ways. The 
recession itself speeded skill-biased technical changes that raised employer skill demands and 
relative rewards for those with college degrees. The lengthy recovery afterward helped raise 
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earnings, even a bit more among low-wage workers than others. Wage gains for Asians and 
Hispanics have also exceeded those for whites and blacks. 
 Yet, these recent developments did not broadly disrupt trends in earnings inequality 
between college and noncollege workers, nor did they alter the fact that median real wages for 
the less-educated have been fairly stagnant (among women) and declining (for men) over most of 
the past four decades. 
 Labor force activity has also followed very different patterns by gender and education.  
Between 1979 and 2000, participation rates rose strongly for women with and without college 
degrees, while they fell for less-educated men. After 2000, they fell for both less-educated men 
and women, and they modestly declined during the Great Recession. Even during the recovery 
from the recession, we see few signs of rebounding labor force participation among less-
educated workers, and significant increases only among educated women. 
 In particular, the longer-term negative trends among less-educated men likely reflect 
hysteresis effects. That is, workers may have difficulty recovering from lengthy periods with no 
work activity, because of depreciating skills, diminishing employer interest, and loss of labor 
market information and contacts with other workers. And while not as cyclical, the recent lack of 
labor-force growth among women is troubling; it likely indicates a need for better policies to 
balance work and family life, such as subsidized child care and paid family leave.     
 Then too, the pandemic-induced recession of 2020 generated large employment losses, 
especially for less-educated workers and those of color. It is too early yet to infer long-term 
employment losses from the recession, or any effects on wages, though our evidence to date on 
the former implies that the recession will exacerbate existing inequalities over time. 
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 What does the future hold? Automation and globalization in the coming decades will no 
doubt continue to challenge the employment circumstances of workers—those both with and 
without college degrees. Many may suffer displacement or declining wages, along with labor 
market withdrawal.   
 What policies might help us reverse the disappointing 40-year trends in labor market 
outcomes for the working class, as well as the more recent and very unequal effects of the 
pandemic-induced recession? Since both market forces (including market failures) and 
institutions have contributed to these outcomes, a wide variety of policy responses might be 
needed to combat them. 
 Such policies could include the following:  
• Strengthening our public higher education (especially community colleges) and 
workforce systems to improve workers’ abilities to adapt to labor market shocks by 
retraining. 
• Strengthening the institutions that support worker compensation for those without 
college degrees, like collective bargaining (or other forms of worker “voice”) and 
minimum wages. 
• Rewards for “high-road” or higher-wage employers who invest in their workers and 
share their profits with them, perhaps through the tax system (Holzer 2019).   
• Additional ways to “make work pay” for lower-wage workers—such as the EITC, as 
well as better paid family leave and subsidized high-quality child care. 
• Policies to enhance competition in product and labor markets, and to limit employer 
restrictions on worker options and information.  
• Special efforts to reduce barriers to work among those with health problems and 
disabilities and/or criminal records. 
• Improving our official labor market statistics, which is critical for managing policy 
and helping employers and workers make the best decisions possible to thrive in a 
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Figure 1  Annual Employment-Population Ratios for Individuals Ages 25–54, 1979–2019 
 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from the Current Population Survey’s basic monthly files. 
 
Figure 2  Annual Labor Force Participation Rates for Ages 25–54, 1979–2019 
 



































Figure 3  Annual Median Real Hourly Wages for Ages 25-54, 1979‒2019 (2019 dollars) 
NOTE:Wages are adjusted for inflation (here and in all data presented below) using the chain-weighted GDP 
deflator for personal consumption expenditures. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from Current Population Survey’s Outgoing Rotation Groups.  
 
 
Figure 4  Median Real Hourly Wages among Employed Individuals with a High School 
Diploma or Less Education, Ages 25–54, by Gender 
 
NOTE: Wages are adjusted for inflation (here and in all data presented below) using the chain-weighted GDP 
deflator for personal consumption expenditures. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from Current Population Survey’s Outgoing Rotation Groups. 
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Figure 5  Median Real Hourly Wages among Employed Individuals with a Bachelor’s 
Degree or More Education, Ages 25–54, by Gender 
 
NOTE: Wages are adjusted for inflation (here and in all data presented below) using the chain-weighted GDP 
deflator for personal consumption expenditures. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from Current Population Survey’s Outgoing Rotation Groups.  
 
 
Figure 6  Labor Force Participation among Individuals with a High School Diploma or 
Less Education, Ages 25–54, by Gender 
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Figure 7  Labor Force Participation among Individuals with a Bachelor’s Degree or More 











SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from the Current Population Survey’s basic monthly files. 
 
Figure 8  Percent Changes in Labor Force Participation (LFP) and Median Real Hourly 
Wages, by Gender and Education, Ages 25–54, 2007–2019 
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Figure 9  Percent Changes in Labor Force Participation (LFP) and Median Real Wages by 











NOTE: Wages are adjusted for inflation (here and in all data presented below) using the chain-weighted GDP 
deflator for personal consumption expenditures. 
SOURCE:  Labor force participation—authors’ calculations, derived from the Current Population Survey’s basic 
monthly files. Median real wages—authors’ calculations, derived from Current Population Survey’s Outgoing 
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Table 1  Real Median Hourly Wages for Employed Individuals, Ages 25‒54, by Race and 
Ethnicity (2019 dollars) 
      
 1979 2000 2007 2010 2019 
      
      
Non-Hispanic White 18.43 20.36 21.62 21.81 23.08 
Males 22.12 23.62 24.03 24.10 25.00 
Females 13.59 17.55 18.80 19.31 21.00 
      
African American 14.75 15.66 16.22 16.64 17.31 
Males 17.69 16.85 17.28 17.22 18.00 
Females 12.50 15.09 15.62 16.07 16.83 
      
Hispanic or Latino  14.04 14.88 14.92 17.00 
Males  14.74 15.62 15.78 18.00 
Females  12.64 13.82 13.77 15.45 
      
Asian  21.06 23.10 22.96 28.00 
Males  23.63 25.99 25.16 30.05 
Females  18.25 20.42 20.66 24.04 
      
NOTE: Table 1 shows labor force participation rates for five different racial and ethnic groups. Blank = not 
available. Prior to 2003, “Asian” and “Pacific Islander” were not separate racial categories. If a respondent 
recorded multiple races, that person was assigned to the smallest individual group of those listed by the 
respondent. (This only applies to a very small number of individuals in 2013 and beyond.)  
SOURCE: The CPS ORG extracts provided by the Center for Economic Policy Research.   
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Table 2  Labor Force Participation Rates, Ages 25‒54, by Race and Ethnicity, 1979–2019 
      
 1979 2000 2007 2010 2019 
      
      
Non-Hispanic White 78.5 85.6 84.5 83.6 84.4 
Males 95.3 92.9 91.7 90.1 90.1 
Females 62.4 78.5 77.4 77.3 78.7 
      
African American 77.0 81.5 80.0 79.0 80.8 
Males 89.0 84.6 83.4 82.1 83.2 
Females 67.4 78.9 77.2 76.3 78.8 
      
Hispanic or Latino  80.4 80.7 80.4 80.4 
Males  92.4 92.6 91.3 90.5 
Females  67.8 67.3 68.1 69.9 
      
Asian  81.0 80.7 80.2 80.3 
Males  91.8 91.0 89.2 90.1 
Females  71.4 71.4 71.9 71.5 
      
American Indian or Pacific Islander   77.7 75.9 76.9 
Males   83.4 80.0 82.5 
Females   69.7 72.4 72.0 
      
NOTE: Blank = not available. Prior to 2003, “Asian” and “Pacific Islander” were not separate racial categories. If 
a respondent recorded multiple races, that respondent was assigned to the smallest individual group of those listed 
by the respondent. (This only applies to a very small number of individuals in 2013 and beyond.)   




Table 3  Adjusted Employment-Population Ratios by Race, Gender, and Education 
during 2020 
      
 Feb. April June Oct. Dec. 
      
      
All individuals 73.9% 55.8% 63.1% 68.1% 68.1% 
      
Non-Hispanic White 75.6% 59.2% 66.7% 71.0% 71.0% 
African American 69.8% 51.5% 57.1% 62.6% 62.3% 
Hispanic or Latino 72.6% 49.9% 58.2% 65.0% 64.2% 
      
Men 79.1% 61.0% 67.9% 73.2% 72.6% 
Women 68.9% 50.8% 58.5% 63.2% 63.7% 
      
Less than high school 55.1% 36.3% 43.3% 50.1% 49.6% 
High school/some college 68.7% 47.4% 56.2% 62.4% 61.9% 
Associate degree 78.1% 59.7% 67.8% 72.0% 71.3% 
Bachelor’s degree 82.3% 67.0% 71.7% 76.5% 77.1% 
Graduate degree 86.5% 75.0% 80.6% 83.4% 83.8% 
      
NOTE: Table 3 is drawn from Hershbein and Holzer (2021). Workers aged 16 to 64 are included. Those who 
were missing from work in the reference week for reasons other than illness, weather, vacation, or labor disputes 
are counted as not employed. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from the Current Population Survey’s basic monthly files. 
 
 
